A Tragedy of the Nomenklatura? Career incentives, political loyalty and political radicalism during China's Great Leap Forward

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Information

  • Status: published (published/forthcoming/under-review/work-in-progress/private/other)
  • Title: A Tragedy of the Nomenklatura? Career incentives, political loyalty and political radicalism during China's Great Leap Forward
  • Authors: DALI L. YANG, HUAYU XU and RAN TAO
    • see notes for institutions
  • Year: 2014
  • Journal: Journal of Contemporary China
  • Doi: /10.1080/13603116.2014.882560
  • Analytical Tools: Unspecified

Abstract

We review James Kung and Shuo Chen’s study, published in the American Political Science Review, on the causes of China’s Great Leap Famine (1959–1961). Kung and Chen explain the variations in provincial leaders’ radicalism on the basis of the career incentives facing the provincial First Secretaries. In this article, we question the validity of their basic assumptions and also uncover serious issues with the Kung and Chen dataset. We conclude that their empirical findings were based on faulty foundations. Our alternative hypothesis instead explains the dynamics of political radicalism during the Great Leap Forward in terms of the provincial leaders’ political loyalty to Mao. Our findings point to the significance of political networks in influencing the behavior of elites and, by extension, political and socioeconomic outcomes.

Analyses

TABLE1. Composition of provincial First Party Secretaries, by CC membership (excluding centrally administered municipalities)

  • Method: Descriptive
  • Data Source: Unspecified.
  • Replication Status:
    • L0:
    • L1:
    • L2:
    • L3:
TABLE1. Composition of provincial First Party Secretaries, by CC membership (excluding centrally administered municipalities)
Year (1) CC members (1a) Of which Politburo member or alternate member (2) CC alternate members (3) Non CC members
1956 8 1 9 8
1957 8 1 8 9
1958 9 2 13 3
1959 10 2 12 3
1960 9 2 13 3
1961 8 2 13 4
1962 7 2 14 4
1963 7 2 14 4
1964 7 2 14 4
1965 6 2 14 5
1966 4 2 13 8
  • Notes:

TABLE 2. Size of the Eighth Central Committee (and Politburo), 1956–1966

  • Method: Descriptive
  • Data Source: Unspecified.
  • Replication Status:
    • L0:
    • L1:
    • L2:
    • L3:
TABLE 2. Size of the Eighth Central Committee (and Politburo), 1956–1966
First Plenum September 1956 Second Plenum May 1958 Eleventh Plenum August 1966
No. of Politburo members 23 26 28
No. of CC members 97 97 97
No. of CC alternate members 73 96 90
  • Notes:

TABLE 3. Composition of the Eighth Central Committee (September 1956)

  • Method: Descriptive
  • Data Source: Unspecified.
  • Replication Status:
    • L0:
    • L1:
    • L2:
    • L3:
TABLE 3. Composition of the Eighth Central Committee (September 1956)
CC full members Number % CC alternate members Number %
Total 97 100 Total 73 100
7th CC full members (FMs) 44 45.36 7th CC full members (FMs) 0 0.00
7th CC alternate members (AMs) 20 20.62 7th CC alternate members (AMs) 3 4.11
7th CC non-members (NMs) 33 34.02 7th CC alternate members (AMs) 70 95.89
Provincial experience Provincial experience
Current PFS or Governor 11 11.34 Current PFS or Governor 13 17.81
7th CC AM + provincial FPS or Governor 1 1.03 7th CC AM + provincial FPS or Governor 0 0.00
7th CC NM + provincial FPS or Governor 8 8.25 7th CC NM + provincial FPS or Governor 13 17.81
  • Notes:



TABLE 4. Comparing excessive procurement ratio data: major differences between Kung/Chen and reconstructed data

TABLE 4. Comparing excessive procurement ratio data: major differences between Kung/Chen and reconstructed data
Year Province code Province name FPS name Party rank–KC Extrap Extrap - KC
1960 1 Gansu 张仲良 1 -7.301 3.313
1961 1 Gansu 汪锋 1 -8.192 3.410
1962 1 Gansu 汪锋 1 -11.521 -3.533
1963 1 Gansu 汪锋 1 -11.439 -1.450
1964 1 Gansu 汪锋 1 -7.205 -1.198
1965 1 Gansu 汪锋 1 -8.204 -0.202
1966 1 Gansu 汪锋 0 -9.372 -3.384
1962 8 Henan 刘建勋 1 -3.406 -1.406
1963 8 Henan 刘建勋 1 -9.763 -0.763
1964 8 Henan 刘建勋 1 -12.641 -0.641
1965 8 Henan 刘建勋 1 -5.133 -1.133
1965 11 Jilin 吴德 1 -5.097 0.102
1960 12 Inner Mongolia 乌兰夫 2 0.731 -1.931
1964 16 Ningxia 杨静仁 0 -3.554 -7.179
1961 17 Shaanxi 张德生 1 3.727 4.218
1960 19 Shanxi 陶鲁笳 1 -0.281 1.274
1961 19 Shanxi 陶鲁笳 1 3.175 4.135
1965 20 Yunnan 阎红彦 1 -3.674 1.672
1966 20 Yunnan 阎红彦 1 -0.864 0.866
1963 21 Liaoning 黄火青 1 8.436 3.139
1958 24 Shandong 舒同 2 -0.522 3.148
1965 24 Shandong 谭启龙 1 -0.873 -1.567
  • Notes:‘Extrap–KC’ is the extra procurement ratio in the Kung and Chen dataset. ‘Extrap’ is the excessive procurement ratio data we reconstructed. ‘Party rank–KC’ is the political rank of the FPS as coded by Kung and Chen (2 stands for CC full membership; 1 for alternate membership; 0 for non-membership). Only the most significant differences are shown here. The full comparison is in the appendix.

TABLE 5a. Two-way, fixed-effects model: replication of Kung and Chen Table 4: Version 1

    • Original data: Online Appendix 5
    • Corrected: "only the most obvious data imputing errors and the inaccurate observations for the CC alternate members who attained their CC alternate membership status in 1958".
TABLE 5a. Two-way, fixed-effects model: replication of Kung and Chen Table 4: Version 1
Dependent variable: excessive procurement ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A province’s FPS was: NM 1.472 0.641 1.298 1.181 1.613 1.120 -0.260
(1.425) (1.661) (1.682) (1.638) (1.760) (1.707) (1.556)
A province’s FPS was: AM 1.273 2.103* 1.527 1.534 1.787 1.699 1.315
(1.136) (1.227) (1.201) (1.182) (1.241) (1.223) (1.053)
A province’s governorwas: NM -1.814 -1.402 −1.749
(2.235) (2.165) (1.621)
A province’s governorwas: AM -2.013 -1.346 1.356
(2.591) (2.554) (1.638)
A province’s governorwas: PM -1.742
(2.386)
Two-year moving average of per capita grain output (MAG) 8.275** 11.97*** 9.144** 8.932** 8.793** 3.573
(3.626) (3.931) (3.914) (3.939) (4.048) (2.864)
NDCs -0.0739** −0.0588** −0.0579** −0.0609** −0.0223
(0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0302) (0.0389)
GDP per capita (log) 9.800*** 9.302** 8.691** 0.939
(3.579) (3.649) (3.956) (1.610)
Proportion of agricultural income 0.133** 0.136** 0.0662 −0.0157
(0.0657) (0.0662) (0.0735) (0.0652)
Agricultural satellites/number of commune 0.983***
(0.309)
Share of cadres with CCP membership −0.141***
(0.0312)
Constant −3.503*** −47.63** −66.49*** −109.5*** −104.5*** −88.40*** 18.42
(1.108) (19.53) (21.07) (25.40) (26.28) (30.23) (16.76)
Observations 264 216 196 196 196 174 125
Number of province 24 24 24 24 24 24
R squared 0.496 0.547 0.513 0.546 0.548 0.623 0.550
P value of AM = NM 0.847 0.271 0.871 0.802 0.904 0.686 0.276
  • Notes:
    • Reference group is full member (FM) of the Central Committee. Standard errors in parentheses. NM, non-member; AM, alternate member; MAG, two-year moving averages of per capita grain output; NDC, natural disaster calamity. Following Kung and Chen, provincial fixed-effects are not controlled in regression (7).
    • ∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.

TABLE 5b. Two-way, fixed-effects model: replication of Kung and Chen Table 4: Version 2

    • Original data: Online Appendix 5
    • Corrected: "only the most obvious data imputing errors and the inaccurate observations for the CC alternate members who attained their CC alternate membership status in 1958" and Party Rank coding rules.
TABLE 5b. Two-way, fixed-effects model: replication of Kung and Chen Table 4: Version 2
Dependent variable: excessive procurement ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A province’s FPS was: NM 2.164 0.624 0.876 0.712 1.132 0.890 -0.260
(1.513) (1.921) (1.938) (1.886) (2.016) (1.957) (1.556)
A province’s FPS was: AM 1.527 2.127* 1.501 1.637 1.963 1.930 1.315
(1.144) (1.230) (1.239) (1.218) (1.294) (1.286) (1.053)
A province’s governor was: NM -1.869 -1.569 −1.749
(2.242) (2.170) (1.621)
A province’s governor was: AM -2.240 -1.663 1.356
(2.605) (2.557) (1.638)
A province’s governor was: PM -1.742
(2.386)
Two-year moving average of per capita grain output (MAG) 7.699** 11.58*** 8.675** 8.364** 8.169** 3.573
(3.612) (3.930) (3.913) (3.943) (4.053) (2.864)
NDCs -0.0747** −0.0596** −0.0581** −0.0623** −0.0223
(0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0299) (0.0389)
GDP per capita (log) 10.08*** 9.601*** 8.861** 0.939
(3.588) (3.644) (3.941) (1.610)
Proportion of agricultural income 0.132** 0.134** 0.0665 −0.0157
(0.0653) (0.0658) (0.0726) (0.0652)
Agricultural satellites/number of commune 0.986***
(0.307)
Share of cadres with CCP membership −0.141***
(0.0312)
Constant −3.818*** −44.42** −64.33*** −108.6*** −103.0*** −85.90*** -8.450
(1.125) (19.70) (21.00) (25.27) (26.14) (30.03) (16.57)
Observations 264 216 196 196 196 174 125
Number of province 24 24 24 24 24 24
R squared 0.498 0.547 0.513 0.547 0.549 0.624 0.550
P value of AM = NM 0.574 0.354 0.710 0.577 0.624 0.537 0.276
  • Notes:
    • Reference group is full member (FM) of the Central Committee. Standard errors in parentheses. Following Kung and Chen, provincial fixedeffects are not controlled in regression (7).
    • ∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.

TABLE 6. Replication of Table 5 in Kung and Chen: two-way, fixed-effects model: controlling for personality and individual characteristics

    • Original data: Online Appendix 5
    • Corrected: "only the most obvious data imputing errors and the inaccurate observations for the CC alternate members who attained their CC alternate membership status in 1958" and Party Rank coding rules.
TABLE 6. Replication of Table 5 in Kung and Chen: two-way, fixed-effects model: controlling for personality and individual characteristics
Dependent Variable: Excess Procurement Ratio (1) (2)
A province’s FPS was: NM −1.188 −1.334
(2.440) (3.276)
A province’s FPS was: AM 1.624 2.962
(1.493) (2.848)
Two-year moving average of per capita grain output (MAG) 9.717** 11.26***
(3.944) (4.167)
NDCs −0.0673** −0.0735**
(0.0283) (0.0286)
GDP per capita (log) 9.828*** 9.872**
(3.620) (4.192)
Age of FPS 0.347 -0.253
(0.302) (0.550)
Years of party membership −0.447 −0.173
(0.287) (0.468)
Constant −114.7*** −100.3***
(28.36) (34.41)
FPS personality control No YES
Observations 196 196
Number of province 24 24
R squared 0.542 0.593
P value of AM = NM 0.145 0.162
  • Notes:
    • Reference group is full member (FM) of the Central Committee. Standard errors in parentheses.
    • ∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.

TABLE 7. Party rank and excessive mortality rate: two-way fixed effects estimation

    • Original data: Online Appendix 5
    • Corrected: "only the most obvious data imputing errors and the inaccurate observations for the CC alternate members who attained their CC alternate membership status in 1958" and Party Rank coding rules.
  • Replication Status:
    • L0:
    • L1:
    • L2:
    • L3:
TABLE 7. Party rank and excessive mortality rate: two-way fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable: excessive mortality rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1958-1962 1956-1966
A province’s FPS was: NM -1.585 -1.123 1.828 -0.899 -0.646 -0.138
(7.666) (7.823) (10.23) (1.963) (1.958) (2.105)
A province’s FPS was: AM -2.179 -2.302 -1.791 -2.063 -2.051 -1.552
(3.787) (3.904) (4.202) (1.379) (1.371) (1.451)
Per capita grain output (log) 0.849 3.698 -6.034* −3.506
(7.809) (9.245) (3.258) (4.042)
Rural pop share 0.249 0.161 0.271 0.207
(0.375) (0.403) (0.195) (0.218)
Income per capita (log) -7.938 -6.081
(7.813) (4.036)
% of areas affected by natural disaster 0.00756 0.0241
(0.0620) (0.0328)
Constant 2.354 -22.91 7.546 0.714 12.31 32.43
(2.931) (50.67) (60.63) (1.454) (24.32) (30.03)
Observations 125 125 119 275 275 256
Number of province 25 25 25 25 25 25
R squared 0.415 0.418 0.421 0.435 0.447 0.451
P value of AM = NM 0.927 0.859 0.696 0.447 0.359 0.405
  • Notes:
    • Reference group is full member (FM) of the Central Committee. Standard errors in parentheses.
    • ∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.


TABLE 8. Provincial leader promotion patterns and performance during the Great Leap Forward

  • Method: Descriptive
  • Data Source: Unspecified.
  • Replication Status:
    • L0:
    • L1:
    • L2:
    • L3:
TABLE 8. Provincial leader promotion patterns and performance during the Great Leap Forward
Number Change in grain output, 1959 over 1958 (%) Mess hall participation rate in 1959 (%) Excess mortality rate 1958–1961 over 1955–1957 (‰)
All provinces 25 -5.73 64.67 20.36
PRPs 11 0.45 54.85 12.54
PSPs 14 -10.57 72.39 26.50
PSPs minus PRPs -11.02 17.55 13.95
P value of PSPs–PRPs = 0 0.048 0.095 0.187
  • Notes: PRPs: provinces where the First Party Secretaries were promoted to the Central Committee through regularized processes. PSPs: provinces where the First Party Secretaries received ‘special’ promotions.


Notes

  • Dali L. Yang is Professor of Political Science and Faculty Director of the Center in Beijing, the University of Chicago;
  • Huayu Xu is a graduate student in the School of Economics, Renmin University of China;
  • Ran Tao is Professor of Economics in the School of Economics, Renmin University of China.
  • The authors wish to thank David Bachman, John Ishiyama, Junyan Jiang, Xin Sun, Daniel Treisman and Lynn White III for helpful comments, and James Kung and Shuo Chen for responding to our query regarding the excess procurement ratio data. The authors can be reached by email at daliyang@uchicago.edu

Replication Research

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